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REcENr CASES

PROCEDURE - FAILURE TO EXHAUST APPELLATE
REMEDIES AS A BAR TO RELIEF
Is relief by motion to vacate on the ground of improper admission into evidence of a coerced confession available to one
who has, by excusable neglect, failed to exhaust his appellate
remedies? In a recent case, Hodges v. United States,1 a divided
court answered the question in the negative.
At a trial before a federal district court the accused's objections to the admissibility of an alleged coerced confession were
overruled and he was convicted of robbery. He failed to appeal
within the period prescribed by law, but three months later he
entered a motion to vacate the sentence in accord with the provisions of 28 U. S. C. § 2255.2 Unsuccessful in the trial court,
he appealed to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit where relief under the motion
was denied on the ground that he had neither exhausted his
appellate remedies nor justified his failure to do so. At a rehearing
before the circuit court the accused explained his failure to appeal
the conviction by showing that he bad not been advised that be
must appeal within ten days and that he had been taken away
after sentencing without opportunity to consult his attorney.
The court, assuming arguendo that the confession was coerced
and that failure to appeal was the result of excusable neglect,
departed from its earlier ruling and denied relief, holding that
in the absence of a "real miscarriage of justice,"3 relief by
collateral attack to correct errors in the admission of evidence is
not available where there has been a failure to exhaust appellate
remedies.
1282 F. 2d 858 (D.C. Cir. 1960); petition for cert. filed 29 U.S.L. Week 2073;
cert. granted 29 U.S.L. Week 324............. U.S ............ , 5 L. Ed. 690 (1961)
(No. 389 Misc., 1960 Term; renumbered No. 748).
2

For an excellent discussion of the history, provisions and pupose of this statute,
see U.S. v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952). Chief Justice Vinson on page
216 of that decision, in discussing the scope of 28 U.S.C. #2255, quoted
a statement from the Judicial Conference Committee on Habeas Corpus:
'This section applies only to Federal sentences. It creates a statutory
remedy consisting of a motion before the court where the movant has been
convicted. The remedy is in the nature of, but much broader than, corarn
nobis. The motion remedy broadly covers all situations where the sentence
is 'open to collateral attack.' As a remedy, it is intended to be as broad as
habeas corpus."

3U.S. v. Hodges, 282 F. 2d 858, 860 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
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The reasoning of the majority in the principal case is that
collateral attack must be prevented from becoming a substitute
for the more orderly appellate procedures and that to allow
collateral attack in cases where there has been a failure to exhaust appellate remedies would necessitate the relitigation of cases
at a time when witnesses may have died and memories faded.
Relative to this argument, the majority relied heavily on the
case, Sunai v. Large,4 where the Supreme Court of the United
States refused to allow habeas corpus to correct a sentence based
upon the improper interpretation of procedural aspects of a
criminal statute, because the accused had not exhausted his
appellate remedies. However, in that case the court, while holding that as a general rule the exhaustion of appellate remedies
is a prerequisite to the availability of relief by collateral attack,
qualified the rule by adding the words, "at least where the error
does not trench on any constitutional rights of defendants nor
involve the jurisdiction of the trial court."5 The court did not
apply an "in the absence of a real miscarriage of justice" principle
such as that employed by the majority in Hodges v. United States.
While the qualification stated in Sunal v. Large may well deal
with miscarriages of justice, it seems primarily to distinguish between errors in denial of constitutional rights and errors not affecting such rights. It should be noted that the reason why the
accused did not appeal in Sunal v. Large was that an appeal
seemed useless, since in the year preceding, an appeal had been
taken and lost on the same issue in another case.6 Three Supreme
4332 U.S. 174 (1947).
5Id., at 182. On page 178 the court pointed out that in the past it had not
rigidly adhered to the requirement that appellate remedies must be first
e.'iausted before collateral attack is available. The court said: "Habeas
corpus has at times been entertained either without consideration of the

adequacy of relief by the appellate route or where an appeal would have
afforded an adequate remedy. Illustrative are those instances where the
conviction was under a federal statute alleged to be unconstitutional,
where there was a conviction by a federal court whose jurisdiction over

the person or the offense was challenged, where the trial or sentence by
a federal court violated specific constitutional guaranties." On pages 178
and 179 the court cited cases in support of the above.
6U.S. v. Rinko, 147 F. 2d 1 (7th Cir., 1945); cert. denied, 325 U.S. 851
(1945). Shortly after the statutory period for appealing the conviction in
question in Sunal v. Large, supra, elapsed the point at issue in that case
was decided in favor of the accused in Estep v. U.S. and Smith v. U.S.,

327 U.S. 114 (1946).
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Court Justices dissented from the majority holding denying relief
in Sunai v. Large,7 on the ground that the qualification added to
the general rule laid down was too narrow and that it should be
extended to include the "excusable failure to appeal" situation
presented in that case.
Recent decisions have held that the admission into evidence
of coerced confessions is violative of the due process requirements
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.8 Collateral attack
has been permitted to remedy convictions supported by such
confessions.9 Thus it would seem that Hodges v. United States
would be within the qualification added to the general rule by
the court in Sunat v. Large.
In United States v. Robinson,10 the Supreme Court refused
to permit an appeal after the statutory time for such relief had
elapsed, even though the failure to enter a timely appeal was due
to "excusable neglect." The majority in Hodges v. United States,
relying on this case, argued that as excusable neglect does not
extend the time to take a direct appeal, a fortiori, it cannot expand
the relief available under the motion to vacate into that available
on direct appeal. However the pertinency of that argument to
the problem in the principal case seems dubious in the light of
the language used in United States v. Robinson, for in a footnote
to its opinion the Supreme Court stated:
The allowance of an appeal months or years after the
expiration of the prescribed time seems unnecessary to the accomplishment of substantial justice, for there are a number
of collateral remedies available to redress denial of basic rights.
Examples are.., the power of a District Court to entertain
a collateral attack upon a judgment of conviction and to
vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence under 28 U. S. C.

§ 2255.11
7

Justices Frankfurter, Rutledge, and Murphy; Justice Burton concurred in the
result.
8
Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954); Payne v. State of Arkansas, 356 U.S.
560 (1958); Spano v. People of State of New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
9
Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954). See, also, Kent v. U.S., 272 F. 2d
795, 798 (1st Cir. 1960); Overman v. U.S., 281 F. 2d 497, 498 (6th Cir.
1960).
10361 U.S. 220 (1960).
11id., at 230.
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Thus it could be argued, as the minority in the principal case
did, that the Supreme Court would envision reliance upon
collateral attack by motion to vacate to avoid injustice in such
situations as that presented in the instant case. The majority in
the principal case argued that the footnote to United States v.
Robinson is not applicable because there has been no denial of
basic rights "within the principles announced in Sunal v. Large."
However, as has been pointed out, the distinction applied there
was one of constitutional rights and lack of jurisdiction, and not
one of "basic rights."
The minority opinion in the principal case holds that failure to
exhaust appellate remedies, if due to excusable neglect, should
not bar relief by collateral attack under a motion to vacate. A
recent case, Larson v. United States,12 supported this position by
indicating that had the accused not deliberately refrained from
appealing, collateral attack by motion to vacate would have been
available. That case involved serious errors in impaneling the
jury, and the reason no appeal was taken was that the accused
feared the possibility of a death sentence if a new trial were
ordered.
The problem presented in the principal case is significant in
that it involves a conflict between the need for preserving orderly
appellate procedures as the primary means of correcting errors in
the trial courts, and the desire to render substantial justice to those
charged with violating the law. To relax the requirement that
there must be an exhaustion of appellate remedies before collateral attack is available would perhaps lead to abuses and overburden the courts. Yet rigid adherence to the requirements seems
to work injustice in some, even if not many, cases. Although
the Supreme Court has not ruled directly on the question presented in the principal case, it would seem that the language of
the court in Sunal v. Large and United States v. Robinson would
indicate that it would look favorably upon the minority position
in Hodges v. United States.

J.E.D.
12275 F. 2d 673 (5th Cir. 1960).

